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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES SICILIANO, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
9378 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's statement of facts is incomplete in that it 
substantially disregards the plaintiff's theory, particularly with 
respect to defendant's negligence. It is, therefore, necessary to 
briefly state the facts as they relate to the plaintiff's theory and 
as they were found by the jury. 
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On September 8, 1952, at approximately 9:00 a.m., plain-
tiff, an immigrant from Italy (R. 116) was told to obtain a 
piece of wire hanging on a nail on a post in the defendant's 
shop (98, 111, 112). Plaintiff then was 53 years of age, a 
machinist for the railroad, and at that time had had 3 3 years 
experience (96). It is stipulated that both the plaintiff and 
defendant were engaged in interstate commerce ( 98) . Prior 
to the accident when the plaintiff had used wire, he had ob-
tained it from the tool room but the tool room had been 
abolished two weeks before the accident ( 104) . When the 
plaintiff reached for the coil of wire he had no difficulty seeing 
it ( 113). It was a coil approximately 8 or 10 inches in diameter 
( 113, 114) hanging over the top of a nail ( 115). Plaintiff did 
not observe the position of the ends of the wire ( 115) . There 
was no way for the plaintiff to know that the wire was danger-
ous or that it would spring from the appearance of it on the 
nail ( 119, 120). As the plaintiff's right hand lifted the wire 
from the post, an end of the coil sprung loose and flipped into 
the plaintiff's eye ( 98, 99) . Plaintiff then dropped the coil 
to the ground and the coil sprang further into a wider diameter 
( 98, 99) . In sum, the evidence was that the position of this 
particular piece of wire on the nail was that of a spring or coil 
and in the particular circumstances it was unsafe for use, the 
ends not having been wrapped around the coil to secure them. 
As a result of the accident the plaintiff eventually lost the 
entire use of his left eye. 
The facts are detailed further in the argument. References 
are to the page of the Record on Appeal unless otherwise 
indicated. 
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POINT I. 
THE JURY'S VERDICT IS SUPPORTED BY SUB-
STANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
Throughout its brief, both in the Statement of Facts and 
Argument, the defendant recites its own theory of the facts 
and arbitrarily ignores the plaintiffs theory as it was adopted 
by the jury. The defendant extensively treats the proposition 
that a roll of wire hanging on a post is not dangerous and that 
liability could not be predicated on negligence consisting solely 
of requiring the use of a roll of wire hanging on a post. Whether 
requiring the use of such wire as it is ordinarily hung would 
constitute negligence in and of itself is not before the court 
in this case. A closer look at the facts is required. 
The plaintiff's theory was that a piece of wire 12 to 15 
feet long was rolled into the position of a coil or spring. The 
diameter of the coil was 8 to 10 inches. When the coil was hung 
on the post the ends were locked either under the coil or among 
some of the strands. There was, in other words, not simply 
''a roll of wire hanging on a nail" but a spring-like coil 12 to 
15 feet long, 8 to 10 inches in diameter, precariously balancing 
in a position so that the ends were locked under or within the 
coil itself. In this position the coil was a trap. It was, as 
defendant admits throughout its brief, innocent enough in 
appearance, but in fact it was treacherous. 
Plaintiff was instructed to get the wire from the post and 
bring it to the pit where he and Bob Wells were going to use 
it to tie back a brake beam (98, 109, 189). Unaware of any 
dangerous condition in the coil ( 113, 114), plaintiff raised his 
right hand to a position approximately level with the top of 
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his head toward the post ( 113) and lifted the coil from the 
nail. The instant that the weight of the coil was released from 
the ends of the wire, the trap was sprung. One of the ends 
of the coil flipped "like lightning" and struck the plaintiff in 
his left eye. Plaintiff dropped the coil to the ground. As the 
coil hit the ground it sprung further so that the diameter of 
the coil was larger on the ground that it was on the post 
(98, 99). 
The question before the jury and the question here is not 
as defendants continuously recite, whether an ordinary roll of 
wire hanging on a nail is a safe tool or safe equipment. In fact, 
the jury was specifically instructed that a piece of wire with 
loose ends hanging on a post at the defendant's shop could not, 
in and of itself, constitute negligence (Instruction No. 20). At 
the same time, ((Whether or not the manner in which this 
wire hung on the post is negligence is for you to determine 
based on all the evidence and such reasonable inferences as may 
be drawn therefrom'' (ibid). 
The evidence and such reasonable inferences as the jury 
drew from it support two propositions: 
(a) A hanging coil of wire in a position of spring or 
tension where the ends are prevented from springing only by the 
weight of the coil or the position of the strands is an unsafe 
piece of equipment. That injury is likely from the use of such 
a coil by one unaware of its cocked position is foreseeable. 
(b) The piece of wire involved in this lawsuit was hang-
ing on the post in such a position of tension as to constitute 
a trap. 
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The first proposition is demonstrated from the very piece 
of wire (Ex. D-1) introduced by the railroad company in this 
lawsuit. While the piece introduced into evidence is probably 
only 20 or 22 inches in length, it is apparent from handling 
and coiling it that unless the ends are secure, they have a 
tendency to flip as soon as pressure on them is released. It is 
to be observed that time after time during the trial, counsel for 
the defendant wrapped the ends of the wire around the coil in 
demonstrating the physical properties of wire to the jury. It is, 
of course, a matter of common knowledge that wire is springy 
by its nature. As the defendant stipulated during the cross-
examination of one of its witnesses, if the ends of a roll of 
wire are fastened around the coil, the ends cannot flip ( 187). 
Yet the plaintiff's foreman, Paul Schenk, admitted that he had 
never issued instructions that the ends should be wrapped 
around the coil ( 18 7) . 
The second of the two propositions is established, without 
contradiction, by the plaintiff's own testimony. He stated over 
and over again on direct and cross examination that when he 
lifted the coil from its position on the nail, an end flipped out 
and hit him in the eye. There is certain! y nothing dubious or 
suspicious about this testimony. He told the same thing to every-
one who inquired about the manner in which the accident 
happened, starting with his foreman and going right on through 
the railroad's claim agent. Further, he testified that when he 
dropped the coil onto the ground, it sprung into a wider 
diameter. The physical properties of wire are such that the 
Court knows this springing action is possible only when the 
wire is coiled in a position of tension. 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The jury necessarily believed the plaintiff's theory in 
this case. Unless it believed that the wire was coiled in a posi-
tion of a spring, it would have been required to find for the 
defendant on the issue of liability under the Court's instructions. 
Upon no other basis can the jury's decision be explained; more-
over, the adoption of that theory is compelled by the un-
disputed evidence in the case. 
Plaintiff does not quarrel with the general doctrine of 
the cases cited by the defendant to the effect that proof of an 
accident is not proof of negligence, and that there must be a 
showing of an unsafe condition upon which to predicate liability 
under FELA cases (De£. brief, 10-18). The jury in the case 
at bar necessarily determined, however, that the particular piece 
of wire in question was hung on the post in such a manner 
as to constitute an unsafe tool or piece of equipment. 
It is to be observed that the defendant itself proved that 
the plaintiff could not have been solely responsible for the 
accident. On cross-examination the defendant's attorney artfully 
drew from the plaintiff the fact that he could not tell by look-
ing at the coil, although it was right in front of his face, that 
there was anything unsafe about it. 
ceQ. You didn't have any reason to believe that if you 
picked that wire up it would spring and flip you 
in the eye? 
"A. I didn't think it would spring." ( 120) 
And again: 
"Q. Mr. ~iciliano, when you s~w that particular wire 
hangtng on the post you dtdn' t see anything about 
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it to cause you to think there was anything wrong, 
did you? 
C(A. I didn't know it was going to flip on me." ( 119) 
Apparently the jury found that, even so, defendant might 
somehow have a voided the accident, and that an offset for 
contributory negligence was appropriate. Defendant cannot get 
any more comfort from adoption of its theory in part than 
from the rejection of it in part. In substance, defendant simply 
asks this Court to adopt a theory of the facts which the jury 
rejected. The point is that Mr. Siciliano happened to be the 
victim caught in the trap. He had nothing to do with hanging 
the wire on the post. No other wire was provided to him. He 
was told to use this particular coil. 
The defendants are totally in error to argue ((There is no 
evidence that the wire was not safe for ordinary handling." 
In a given hypothetical case an argument might be tnade that 
a roll of wire as it is customarily hung upon a post with loose 
ends may be not unsafe for ordinary handling. But that is not 
our case. The jury in the case at bar expressly rejected the 
argument that this particular coil of wire was an ordinary one 
or that it was hung in an ordinary way. The jury instead ap-
proved and adopted the plaintiff's theory that the coil was 
hanging as a spring in a position of tension and that when the 
weight was released from the ends, one of them sprang out 
((like lightning" and injured the plaintiff. In this kind of a 
case the authorities require the acceptance of the jury's verdict. 
Common law concepts with respect to liability for negli-
gence were drastically revised by the Federal Employer's Lia-
bility Act. It is not necessary under that act that employer negli-
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
gence be shown to be the sole proximate cause of in jury· The 
employer is liable if its negligence played ccany part at all." 
The rule itself bears repetition. In Rogers v. Missouri Pac. 
R.R. Co. (1957) 352 U.S. 500, 1 L.Ed. (2d) 493, 77 S. Ct. 443, 
Reh. d., 353 U.S. 943, 1 L.Ed. (2d) 764, 77 S. Ct. 808, the 
U.S. Supreme Court said: 
ccThe jury was instructed to return a verdict for the 
respondent if it was found that negligence of the 
petitioner was the sole cause of his mishap. We must 
take it that the verdict was obedient to the trial judge's 
charge and that the jury found that such was not the 
case but that petitioner's injury resulted at least in part 
from the respondent's negligence. 
* * * * 
c (Under this statute the test of a jury case is simply 
whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion 
that employer negligence played any part, even the 
slightest, in producing the injury or death for which 
damages are sought. It does not matter that, from the 
evidence, the jury may also with reason, on grounds 
of probability, attribute the result to other causes, 
including the employee's contributory negligence. Judi-
cial appraisal of the proofs to determine whether a jury 
question is presented is narrowly limited to the single 
inquiry whether, with reason, the conclusion may be 
drawn that negligence of the employer played any 
part at all in the injury or death. Judges are to fix 
their sights primarily to make that appraisal and, if 
that test is met, are bound to find out that a case for 
the jury is made out whether or not the evidence allows 
the jury a choice of other probabilities. The statute 
expressly im~o~es liability upon ~e employer to pay 
damages for InJury or death due tn whole or in part' 
to its negligence. (Emphasis added.) [By the Court]." 
* * * * 
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((The statute supplants that [common law] duty with 
the far more drastic duty of paying damages for injury 
or death at work due in whole or in part to the em-
ployer's negligence. The employer is stripped of his 
common-law defenses and for practical purposes the 
inquiry in these cases today rarely presents more than 
the single question whether negligence of the employer 
pia yed any part, however small, in the in jury or death 
which is the subject of the suit. The burden of the 
employee is met and the obligation of the employer 
to pay damages arises, when there is proof, even though 
entirely circumstantial, from which the jury may with 
reason make that inference.'' 
The Supreme Court express! y ruled in Note 13 of the 
foregoing opinion: 
((Moreover, twhat constitutes negligence for the 
statute's purposes is a federal question, not varying 
in accordance with the differing conceptions of negli-
gence under state and local laws for other purposes. 
Federal decisional law formulating and applying the 
concept governs.' ·urie v. Thompson, 337 US 163, 
174, 93 L ed 1282, 1295, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 11 ALR 2d 
252." 
The majority of the Court pointedly observed that its 
review of cases was because it was ((Cognizant of the duty to 
effectuate the intention of Congress to secure the right of jury 
determination ... " in this class of cases and that ((In a relatively 
large percentage of cases reviewed, the Court has found that 
lower courts have not given proper scope to this integral part 
of the congressional scheme. . . . The decisions of this Court 
after the 1939 amendment teach that Congress vested the 
power of decision in these actions exclusively in the jury in all 
but the infrequent cases where fair-minded jurors cannot bon-
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estly differ whether fault of the employer played any part in 
the employee's injury." (Emphasis by Appellee.) In note No. 
26 to the majority opinion the Court took the pains to cite 17 
cases where lower courts were reversed for failure to allow the 
jury's verdict to stand. 
The Rogers decision has been applied and followed con-
sistently by a majority of the court. Webb v. Illinois Cent. R. 
Co. (1957) 352 U.S. 512, 1 L.Ed. (2d) 503, 77 S. Ct. 451; Shaw 
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. ( 1957) 353 U.S. 920, 1 L.Ed 
( 2d) 718, 77 S. Ct. 680; Futrelle v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 
( 1957) 353 U.S. 920, 1 L.Ed (2d) 718, 77 S. Ct. 682; Deen 
v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. ( 1957) 353 U.S. 925, 1 L.Ed (2d) 
721, 77 S. Ct. 715; Thomson v. Texas & Pac R. Co. (1957) 353 
U.S. 926, 1 L.Ed (2a) 722, 77 S. Ct. 698; Arnold v. Panhandle 
& S. F. R. Co. ( 1957) 353 U.S. 360, 1 L.Ed (2d) 889, 77 S. Ct. 
840; Ringhiser v. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. ( 1957) 354 U.S. 901, 
1 L.Ed (2d) 1268, 77 S. Ct. 1093; McBride v. Toledo Terminal 
R. Co. (1957) 354 U.S. 517, 1 L.Ed (2d) 1534, 77 S. Ct. 1398; 
Gibson v. Thompson {1957) 355 U.S. 18, 2 L.Ed (2d) 1, 78 
S. Ct. 2; Honeycutt v. Wabash R. Co. {1958) 355 U.S. 424, 
2 L.Ed (2d) 380, 78 S. Ct. 393; Ferguson v. St. Louis-San 
Francisco R. Co. ( 1958) 356 U.S. 41, 2 L.Ed (2d) 571, 78 
S. Ct. 671; Butler v. Whitman (1958) 356 U.S. 271, 2 L.Ed 
(2d) 754, 78 S. Ct. 734; Moore v. Terminal R.R. Assn. {1958) 
358 U.S. 31, 3 L.Ed (2d) 24, 79 S. Ct. 2; Harris v. Penn. R.R. 
Co. (1959) 361 U.S. 15, 4 L.Ed (2d) 1, 80S. Ct. 22; Conner 
v. Butler (1959) 361 ·u.s. 29, 4 L.Ed (2d) 10, 80s. Ct. 21; 
Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp. ( 1959) 361 U.S. 
107, 4 L.Ed (2d) 142, 80 S. Ct. 173; Davis v. Virginian Rail-
way Co. (1960) 361 U.S. 354, 4 L.Ed (2d) 366, 80S. Ct. 387. 
10 
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While some of these cases are under the Jones Act, they 
expressly adopt the rules of the Rogers case for FELA actions. 
In all of the later cases is tacit and explicit recognition of the 
philosophy of FELA cases as stated by Mr. Justice Brennan 
for the majority in Sinkler v. Missouri R.R. Co., 356 U.S. 326, 
2 L.Ed (2d) 799, 78 S. Ct. 758 at 802, 8.03 L.Ed: 
ccThis statute, an avowed departure from the rules of 
the common law, cf. Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 
352 US 500, 507-509, 1 L Ed (2d) 493, 499-501, 77 
S. Ct. 443, was a response to the special needs of rail-
road workers who are daily exposed to the risks in-
herent in railroad work and are bel pless to provide 
adequately for their own safety. Tiller v. Atlantic 
Coast Line R. Co., 318 US 54, 87 L Ed 610, 53 S. Ct. 
44, 143 ALR 967. The cost of human injury, an in-
escapable expense of railroading, must be borne by 
someone, and the FELA seeks to adjust that expense 
equitable between the worker and the carrier. Kernan 
v. American Dredging Co., 355 US 426, 431, 438, 
2 L Ed ( 2d) 382, 388, 392, 87 S. Ct. 394. The Senate 
Committee which reported the Act stated that it was 
designed to achieve the broad purpose of promoting 
cthe welfare of both employer and employee, by adjust-
ing the losses and injuries inseparable from industry 
and commerce to the strength of those who in the 
nature of the case ought to share the burden'. S. Rep. 
No. 460, 60th Cong. 1st Sess. 3." 
Detailed analysis of all these cases obviously is impractic-
able in this brief. Most of them are treated in an annotation at 
4 ALR (2d) 1787 et seq. entitled ctSupreme Court Reviews of 
Sufficiency of Evidence in Cases under Federal Employers' 
Liability Act," where the annotator summarizes (p. 1793, note 
8) that ccln view of the breadth of the rule stated in the Supreme 
11 
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Court (Rogers) case ... earlier cases decided in favor of the 
defendant, although the plaintiff had obtained a jury verdict, 
should be re-examined in the light of the Rogers and Webb 
cases." It is significant that both of the U. S. Supreme Court 
cases relied upon by defendant in Point I of its brief, namely 
Wilkerson v. McCarthy, (1949) 336 U.S. 53, 93 L. Ed. 497, 
69 S. Ct. 413 (De£. Brief 8, the court holding, incidentally, 
that the jury should have been permitted to rule on the case); 
Brady v. Southern Ry. Co., ( 1943) 320 U. S. 476, 88 L.Ed. 
239, 64 S. Ct. 232 (De£. brief 8, 11, 12-14, 16-17) were 
decided prior to the Rogers decision. To the extent that these 
cases represent a different point of view in FELA cases, they 
require appraisal "in the light of the Rogers and Webb cases" 
(Anno. 4 ALR ( 2d) 1787 at note 8) and, it is submitted, 
the many cases which have expressly adopted the point of 
view inherent in these decisions. 
The factual situation involved in some of these cases is 
of interest by the way of comparison with the case at bar. 
In Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. (1957) 
352 U.S. 521, 1 L.Ed (2d) 511, 77 S. Ct. 459, a ship's baker 
was injured when he undertook to remove ice cream from a 
container with a sharp butcher knife. His hand slipped into 
the knife blade. The Second Circuit held that the use of the 
knife as an ice cream scoop could not have been foreseen 
by the employer. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
the jury could conclude that the baker had been furnished no 
safe tool and that since he was required to fill ice cream 
orders placed with him by ship's waiters, the use of the butcher 
knife for that purpose could be found to be foreseeable. The 
could said that " . . . the standard of liability under the Jones 
12 
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Act is that established by Congress under the FELA . 
and quoted the Rogers case in support of the decision. 
,, 
In Honeycutt v. Wabash R.R. Co. (1958) 355 U.S. 424, 
2 L.Ed. ( 2d) 380, 78 S. Ct. 393, the employee sought recovery 
for injuries sustained when a rivet gun with which he was 
working under a railroad car discharged a metal clip and struck 
him in the forehead. The trial court had entered a judgment 
on a verdict for plaintiff but had been reversed by the St. Louis 
Court of Appeals, 303 SW (2d) 153. The Supreme Court re-
versed the Court of Appeals and ordered that judgment be en-
tered on the verdict holding that the proofs justified the jury's 
conclusion that employer negligence played a part in producing 
the injury. 
In Conner v. Butler ( 1959) 361 U.S. 29, 4 L.Ed (2d) 
10, 80 S. Ct. 21, a railroad hose cutter was alighting from a 
passenger car. A movable portion of the platform car secured 
in a raised position by a latching device fell on his hand. A 
judgment entered on a motion for directed verdict was reversed 
by the Supreme Court stating that under the Rogers case ((the 
proofs were sufficient to submit to the jury the question whether 
employer negligence played a part in producing the petitioner's 
injury." It is submitted that this case is extremely close on the 
facts to the case at bar. 
In Davis v. Virginian R.R. Co. (1960) 361 US 354, 4 
L. Ed. (2d) 366, 80 S. Ct. 387, the plaintiff was injured while 
shifting various railroad cars on its tracks near Norfolk, Vir-
ginia. The negligence charged was that plaintiff was required 
to do his work too quickly and was furnished inexperienced 
help so that he had to work faster than usual. The court said: 
13 
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nThe record indicates that petitioner would have 
taken his position on the ground rather than on the 
railroad cars but for the inexperience of the brakemen. 
This required petitioner to take his position on ~op 
of the cars in order to assist the brakemen-a functlon 
not ordinarily performed by a ya~d conducto!. We think 
it should have been left to the JUry to dectde whether 
the respondent's direction to complete_ the spotting 
operation within 30 minutes, plus ~e( tmp_ort~nc~ of 
the brakemen assigned to perform this hot JOb, trught 
have precipitated petitioner's injury. (The debatable 
quality of that issue, the fact that fair-minded men 
might reach different conclusions, emphasize the appro-
priateness of leaving the question to the jury. The jury 
is the tribunal under our legal system to decide that 
type of issue (Tiller v. Atlantic Coast LineR. Co., 318 
US 54, 87 L.Ed. 610, 63 S. Ct. 444, 143 ALR 967) 
as well as issues involving controverted evidence. Jones 
v. East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co., 128 US 443, 445; 
Washington & Georgetown R. Co. v. McDade, 135 
US 554, 572. To withdraw such a question from the 
jury is to usurp its functions.' Bailey v. Central Vermont 
R. Co., 319 US 350, 353, 354, 97 L.Ed. 1144, 1147, 
63 S. Ct. 1062 (1943) :· 
Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc. ( 1960) ____ US ___ _ 
5 L.Ed. 2 (d) 20, 81 S. Ct. ____ , was under the Jones Act, but the 
court has expressly held that the standard under the Jones 
Act is the same as under the Federal Employers Liability 
Act. See Ferguson v. J\1oore-McC,ormack, supra. Plaintiff was 
injured when a wrench dropped on his left foot. The Captain's 
report filled out immediately after the plaintiff related the 
facts to him stated: ('While working with pump man in pump 
room, man said he dropped the wrench on his foot and his 
toe has been sore ever since." Plaintiff claimed that the wrench 
was not reasonably fit for its intended use. The court said 
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that the question was whether the evidence was sufficient 
"to raise a jury question whether the respondent failed to 
exercise due care in furnishing the wrench which was not a 
reasonable suitable appliance.'' At the trial, plaintiff claimed 
that the wrench slipped off a nut when it was struck with a 
mallet. The court said that even though there was no direct 
evidence of play in the jaw of the wrench, the jury Ctcould 
reasonably have found that the wrench repeatedly slipped 
from the nut because the jaw of the wrench did not properly 
grip them." A jury question was thus made and the Rogers 
case was quoted for the proposition that nit does not matter, 
from the evidence, the jury may also with reason on grounds 
of probability attribute the result to other causes.'' 
The facts of the case at bar bring it well within the lines 
drawn by the Supreme Court not only on the principles stated 
in Rogers v. Missouri RR but on the kind of factual situations 
which the Supreme Court repeatedly has ruled were jury ques-
tions. The accident here did not Ct just happen." It was the 
result of a chain of events. All of the events were put into 
motion by the railroad itself or its employees and agents. 
Defendant, in effect, hung the trap on the post. Defendant 
required plaintiff to use the trap without advising him of its 
hazardous condition. Defendant failed to furnish a piece of 
wire not unsafe for ordinary use. 
The jury by its verdict, and the trial judge in ruling on 
the motions presented, determined after hearing the facts and 
weighing the probabilities and taking into account the physical 
facts with respect to the accident and no doubt considering 
the undisputed evidence that when the plaintiff dropped the 
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coil to the ground it spread out, determined that employer 
negligence played at least some part in the injury. The con-
clusion of the jury is not only a fair inference, it is compelled 
by the evidence in this case. The jury could and did find, with 
reason, that defendant's negligence played a part in causing 
the accident. It is submitted that the Supreme Court has ruled 
that tcjudges are to fix their sites primarily to make that 
appraisal, and, if that test is made, are bound to find that a 
case for the jury is made out of whether or not the evidence 
allows the jury a choice of other probabilities." Rogers v. 
Missouri RR, supra. 
POINT II. 
DEFENDANT CANNOT COMPLAIN THAT TWO 
JURORS WERE EXCUSED. 
In its Point No. II, the defendant argues that the case 
should be retried because two prospective jurors, Stanton Peck 
and Ray A. Norton, were excused by the Court on its own 
initiative. The defendant argues to the court that the selection 
of jurors is particularly important to the railroad company 
in FELA cases (De£. Brief 18, 19). The defendant in this 
case requested a special panel and during the interrogation 
of the panel the court excused Messrs. Peck and Norton because 
the former was related to one of the attorneys for the plaintiff 
and the latter was a business associate. Notwithstanding the 
special care with which defendant on appeal says it selects 
the jurors, its counsel made no objection to the court's actions 
and did not bring the matter to the attention of the court 
in any manner whatever until after the trial of the case and 
16 
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the jury had retired to consider its verdict. The matter was 
not formally brought to the attention of the court and counsel 
for the plaintiff until after the verdict was returned. De-
fendant now argues that it should have a second chance with 
a new jury which presumably it would select with the same 
painstaking care employed in the selection of the first. 
It is submitted that the raising of this particular point 
on appeal demonstrates as much as any other single argument 
made, the inherent weakness of the defendant's position in 
this case. 
The first juror excused was Mr. Peck. In 1957 George 
M. McMillan, one of the attorneys for plaintiff, was associated 
in the practice of law with McKay, Burton, McMillan & Rich-
ards in the Newhouse Building. He acted as the attorney 
for the Allsteel Office Supply Company and in connection 
with that employment was requested to review the stock-
holders' agreement between the stockholders of that company 
and Stanton Peck. Part of his duties involved certain estate 
planning problems with Mr. Peck. An attorney-client relation-
ship existed between Mr. Peck and Mr. McMillan at that time 
(R. 65-A, 65-B). 
Mr. Norton and George M. McMillan are second cousins, 
but more than that, they have had close family and social 
relationships for more than 30 years. They went to school 
together, participated together in band, orchestra, opera, choral 
work and similar activities. They traveled together to various 
cities in the states giving concerts and participating in 
various kinds of music contests ( 54-B, 65-C). Mr. Norton's 
wife is the secretary of the n1anager of one of the regular 
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clients of McMillan and they are together frequently at social 
gatherings related to such employment ( 65-C). The record 
in this case is to the effect that tC • • • the Court's action in 
excusing prospective jurors Norton and Peck was intended 
by the Court to insure the defendant corporation's having 
a fair and impartial trial," and it appeared from tC ••• the 
atmosphere, chain of events and occurrences at the time of 
the selection of said jury that the general feeling in the court-
room appeared to be that such action by the Court was for 
the purpose of insuring a fair trial to the defendant corporation 
and was not intended or generally felt to be adverse to its 
interests." ( 65-e). 
What the defendant is arguing here is that it takes great 
pains to select its jury in such a manner as to enable it to 
have another chance when it loses the lawsuit. There is no 
possible justification for allowing the defendant to hand-pick 
two juries. 
The law is well settled both before and after the adoption 
of Rule 46 that a litigant must call to the attention of the 
trial judge diligently any irregularity in the selection of a 
jury he expects to claim error on appeal. Almost squarely in 
point is Adler v. Adler (1950), 61 SE (2d) 824, 207 Ga. 394. 
There the trial judge disqualified four jurors on voir dire. 
The proponents of a will which was the subject of the litigation 
made no objection and the Supreme Court of Georgia held 
that failure to object constituted a waiver of any irregularities. 
The court follo\ved Gunther v. State (1917) 92 SE 314, 19 
Ga. App. 772 ( 2), which applied the same rule in a criminal 
case. 
18 
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Courts have held uniformly that a party having knowledge 
of any matter which might affect the integrity or impartiality 
of a juror cannot remain silent and take his chance that the 
verdict may be favorable and then complain if an adverse 
judgment is rendered. 'fhe rule has been applied in a variety 
of factual situations. In Arena v. John P. Squire Company 
(1947) 73 NE(2d) 836, 321 Mass. 424, the defendant had 
been denied a new trial after an adverse judgment. Defendant 
appealed urging that the trial judge did not ascertain whether 
the jurors had talked to anyone about the case during an in-
terval between deliberating sessions. The Massachuset!ts 
Supreme Court indicated that such irregularities were within 
the discretion of the trial judge on a motion for new trial. 
It stated: "A party having knowledge of a matter that might 
affect the integrity or impartiality of a jury cannot remain silent 
and take his chance that the verdict may be favorable and 
then complain if an adverse verdict is returned. Hallock v. 
Franklin, 2 Met. 558; Rowe v. Canney, 139 Mass. 41, 29 NE 
219; Randolph v. O'Riorden, 155 Mass. 331, 29 NE 583; Hill 
v. Greenwood, 160 Mass. 256, 35 NE 558. See also Young v. 
City of New York, 5 NYS (2d) 74, 265 App. Div. 881." 
Utah abolished the necessity of formal exceptions long 
before the adoption of Rule 46 (1933 Code, Sec. 104-24-18, 
104-39-2). The committee on the adoption of the Code re-
ported that Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
was the same as the federal rule "with some unnecessary 
language deleted." Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, page 63, 
Committee Note. Rule 46 in the Federal Rules became effective 
in federal courts September 16, 1938. (Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 86; Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and 
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Procedure, Rules Edition, Vol. 1, pg. 18). Rule 46 stands as 
promulgated at that time. Moore Federal Practice 2nd Ed., 
par. 46.01. Prof. Moore discusses the effect of Rule 46 at 
par. 46.02. He points out that formal exceptions were made 
unnecessary but he states: 
''The rule retains, however, the fundamental basis 
of the former practice by requiring a party to make 
known to the court the action desired, and his grounds 
therefor, at the time the ruling or order is made or 
sought, if he has an opportunity to do so. The purpose 
of the former practice was two-fold: ( 1) to appraise 
the court of the litigant's position so that the court 
in the furthering of justice might correct its ruling 
was shown to be error; and (b) to permit an opponent 
to obviate the defect where possible. Rule 46 retains 
this purpose. It is still necessary for the party to make 
it clear to the court that he objects to the court's action, 
and to state the grounds on which he basis his objec-
tion, in order that the defect may be obviated, is pos-
"bl '' st e ... 
Federal courts have consistently ruled since the adoption 
of Rule 46 that irregularities in the selection of a jury must 
be called to the attention of the trial judge at the time if 
a party expects to predicate error upon them. In U.S. z·. Meyer 
(CCA 7, 1940) 113 F(2d) 387 at 396, the court said: 
HA complete answer to the defendants' position with 
regard to the venire exists in the well known rule that 
errors in the manner of drawing a jury must be pre-
sented by challenge to the array before, or at the latest, 
at the time of the examination of the jury . . . The 
record discloses no prejudice or injury to defendants. 
And the charges of defendants are vague and uncertain 
in this respect. Courts do not reverse in such a situatton, 
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unless the record discloses that the party complaining 
was substantially prejudiced." 
The observation of Judge Clark for the Second Circuit in 
Reck v. Pacific and Atlantic SS Co. (CCA 2, 1950) 180 F(2d) 
866, 870, although on a different point, is particularly appro-
priate here: 
n1~his is peculiarly the type of objection which under 
rule 46, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, should have 
been made clear at the time, since it could and undoubt-
edly would have led to an immediate correction of 
whatever error of form may have been disclosed. De-
fendant cannot entrap a successful plaintiff by thus 
reserving its fire, particular! y on a matter as inconse-
quential as this. We think defendant received a fair 
trial, and there is no reason to disturb the judgment on 
the verdict against it.., 
The defendant admits c•the right to challenge a juror is 
a right which may be waived" (De£. Brief 21). Conversely, 
the right to object to the improper excusing of a witness may 
also be waived. These waivers occur every day in the court-
rooms of the state. Jurors request to be excused for business 
or personal reasons, and judges, without even disclosing to 
the litigants or their counsel the nature of the reason, excuse 
the jurors from the panel. One of the jurors in this case was 
thus excused (Juror No. 1, R. 9). Certainly a party cannot 
stand by and permit a juror to be relieved from duty, then 
after it has lost the case, ask the appellant court to reverse 
on the theory that if that particular juror instead of another 
had heard the facts, appellant may not have lost. Rule 46 
makes unnecessary formal exceptions to rulings of the court, 
but it states celt is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling 
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or order of the court is made or sought makes known to the 
court the action which he desires the court to take or his 
objection to the action of the court and his grounds there-
for . . . " It is to be observed that the defendant's counsel 
in this case requested a recess to discuss the selection of jurors 
with his client before the jurors were selected ( 94) and after 
the selection the court stated: 
((Are these the individuals selected, Mr. McMillan?" 
''Mr. McMillan: Yes, your Honor. 
''The Court: Mr. Ashton? 
((Mr. Ashton: Yes, your Honor." 
Thus, despite being present and having ample opportunity 
to object to the excusing of the jurors Peck and Norton, and 
knowing that the court had actually exercised two challenges 
for the defendant which obviously were intended for the de-
fendant's benefit, the defendant went to trial without breathing 
a word to anyone that it was prejudiced. 
In this postur~ it is submitted that the appellant cannot 
be heard to argue as it does in pages 22 and 23 of its brief 
that if only jurors Peck and Norton could have been retained, 
it could have excused two of the women. This is a particularly 
facitious argument in view of the fact that the record shows 
that the defendant exercised its challenges with respect to 
Edward J. Callahan, a tile setter (R. 9, 85), Fred Naisbitt, a 
boiler operator (R. 9, 85), and Max A. Finlayson, a powder 
lineman for Hercules Powder (R. 9, 84). 
In sum on this point, appellant does not even suggest 
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that it can show prejudice. Instead, it tacitly admits that the 
Court's action in excusing two prospective jurors was thought 
to be in its interest at the time. It failed to object or other-
wise indicate disapproval of the court's action. Having taken 
its chances with the jury selected, defendant is now in no 
position to urge error. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS WERE NOT PREJU-
DICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT. 
(a) Instruction No. 7 was adequate and not misleading 
to the jury. 
In its Point No. III the defendant takes exception to the 
italicized portion of the following sentence in Instruction No. 7: 
" ... This duty does not require the absolute elimi-
nation of all danger, or hazard, but it does require 
the elimination of all danger or hazard which the 
exercise of reasonable care could remove or guard 
against, and this applies to the condition with which 
we are concerned." 
The word (Cthis" was obviously intended to relate not only 
to the latter portion of the said sentence which described the 
danger which had to be eliminated, but the portion of the 
sentence which refers to the danger which does not have to 
be eliminated. The defendant asks the court to disregard the 
meaning of the whole instruction and to totally disregard 
the portion of Instruction No. 7 prior to the phrase to which 
objection is taken. In other words, the sentence might be 
construed to mean CCThis duty does not require the absolute 
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elimination of all danger of hazard . . . and this applies to 
the condition with which we are concerned" with the same 
certainty that defendant asks the court to construe it, namely, 
(' . . . it does require the elimination of all danger of hazard 
which the exercise of reasonable care could remove or guard 
against, and this applies to the condition with which we are 
concerned." It is apparent that the Court was simply telling 
the jury that foreseeability of harm is an element of negligence. 
This is clear from the balance of the instruction: 
"The amount of caution required by that duty varies 
in direct proportion to the dangers known to be in-
volved in this work. To put the matter in another way, 
the amount of care required of a railroad company in 
the exercise of ordinary care, to furnish its employees 
with a reasonably safe place within which to work, or 
safe tools and equipment increases or decreases as 
do the dangers that reasonably should be apprehended. 
Failure of the defendant to discharge this duty of using 
reasonable care to provide its employees with a safe 
place in which to work or with safe appliances, equip-
ment or tools for his work would constitute negligence." 
Such is the obvious meaning of the instruction when con-
sidered with Instructions 8, 10 and 16. 
(b) Instruction No. 16 was not prejudicial. 
In its Instruction No. 16, the Court specifically instructed 
the jury that if "the injuries were caused solely by the negli-
gence of the plaintiff or that the defendant was not negligent, 
you must return a verdict in favor of the defendant and against 
the plaintiff no cause of action." Defendant's attempting to 
take the word "or" in subparagraph 3 of the Instruction out 
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of context totally perverts the substance and effect of the 
instruction. 
It is simply not true, moreover, that there was no instruc-
tion on proximate cause. In Instruction No. 10, requested by 
the defendant, the Court advised the jury, (<Negligence, if any, 
and whether such negligence, if any, was a proximate cause 
of the accident resulting in in jury to Siciliano must be proved 
by plaintiff Siciliano to the extent of a preponderance of the 
evidence" ( 48), and proximate cause was defined as "that 
cause which in a natural continuous sequence, unbroken by 
any new cause, produced the injury and without which the 
injury would not have occurred" ( 41), and again in Instruction 
No. 6 the Court said: CCI£ the injury is caused solely by the 
negligence of the employee, or if the defendant is not negligent, 
then, of course, no recovery may be had by said employee." 
The defendant's argument to the effect that the instructions 
as a whole eliminated the necessity of finding proximate cause 
is wholly fallacious. 
(c) The instruction on assumption of risk was not preju-
dicial. 
In its Point No. 5, defendant argues that the portion of 
the Court's Instruction No. 6 on assumption of risk should 
not have been given. The argument is based on the idea that 
assumption of risk is not an issue in the case. In Instruction 
No. 6 the Court was explaining in a general way the provisions 
of the Federal Employers Liability Act. That act expressly 
provides that assumption of risk does not constitute a defense. 
Bruner v. McCarthy, 105 Ut. 399, 142 P(2d) 649, involved 
a situation where apparently the Court was reaching for a 
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basis upon which to predicate reversal. In the course of the 
discussion, the author of the majority opinion asserted as 
pure dicta that an instruction on assumed risk should not have 
been given. The Court expressly found, however, that giving 
of the instruction was not prejudicial. Similarly in Moore v. 
U. P. R.R., 4 Ut. 2, 255, 292 P(2d) 849, the Court expressly 
refused to rule that the giving of an instruction on assumed 
risk was reversible error. 
In the case at bar, it is gratuitous to suppose that de-
fendant's counsel had not argued a point in connection with 
defendant's motion to dismiss whereby the Court felt it neces-
sary to point out that employees did not assume the risk of 
employment as far as FELA cases are concerned. It is to be 
observed that the instruction on assumed risk was only a 
statement of the statutory provision. The law was correctly 
stated in the instruction and the defendant does not argue 
to the contrary. The jury was clearly instructed on the elements 
of liability and could not possibly have been misled. The 
jury was plainly told that the only basis for recovery by 
plaintiff was a finding that the defendant was negligent and 
that such negligence played a part in producing plaintiff's 
injury. It must be realized that the rule is that plaintiff can 
recover if defendant's negligence played any part at all. Roger 
v. Missouri R.R. and other cases cited in Point I of this 
brief. Particularly inasmuch as the sentence complained of 
was contained in an explanation of the principles provided by 
the Federal Employers Liability Act, it cannot be stretched 
out of context to justify reversal in this action. 
(d) Failure to instruct that the railroad conzpany has the 
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right to assume that employees would exercise reasonable care 
for their own safety is not prejudicial error. 
The court instructed the jury over and over again that 
the plaintiff could not recover if any negligence by him was 
the sole proximate cause of the accident (Instruction No. 6, 
R. 44; of Instruction No. 8, R. 46; Instruction No. 10, R. 48). 
To say that the defendant had the right to assume that 
the employees would exercise reasonable care for their own 
safety could be argued to mean that even though the defendant 
was negligent, if the plaintiff was also negligent, i.e., if he 
did not exercise reasonable care for his own safety, he could 
not recover at all. The FELA expressly provides that con-
tributory negligence does not constitute a defense unless such 
negligence is the sole proximate cause of the accident. Adopting 
the defendant's theory as argued in its Point No. 6 would be 
to tell the jury in substance and effect that if the defendant 
did not exercise care for his own safety, that is to say, if he 
was contributorily negligent, that such negligence would con-
stitute a defense; thus the purpose and meaning of the act 
would be thwarted. While such a device may be a credit to 
the ingenuity of counsel for the railroad, it simply does not 
constitute the law in cases of this kind. The defendant's re-
quested instructions with respect to contributory negligence 
were substantially given by the court. The form of the instruc-
tion as required by the defendant that the defendant ((was 
not required to foresee negligence on the part of the plaintiff'' 
was not a correct statement of the law. Failure to give the 
instruction cannot constitute error. 
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POINT IV 
THE AMOUNT OF THE AWARD WAS NOT EX. 
CESSIVE. 
The jury found that the damages sustained by plaintiH 
were in the sum of $30,000 and reduced them $7500 for 
contributory negligence. The jury was carefully instructed 
on the question of damages (Instruction No. 17, R. 55, 56). 
It was told that ((sympathetic feelings have no place whatever 
in the trial of a case in a court of justice" (Instruction No. 
18, R. 57). The Court's Instruction No. 14 is not objected 
to by defendant here. It may be assumed, therefore, that the 
defendant is in agreement that the jury could properly take 
into account the factors enumerated in that instruction. Plain-
tiff's age, earning capacity are not the only relevant . fac-
tors. Also to be considered are the character and extent and 
severity of his injuries, the pain and suffering, if any, which 
he may expect reasonably to endure in the future, While at 
the trial level defendant apparently concedes that permanent 
disability is only one of the elements of damage, its brief 
on appeal chooses to ignore completely any consideration 
of the extent to which plaintiff has been totally deprived of 
vision in his left eye, his physical and mental suffering, the 
shock to his nervous system and impairment of his general 
health (R. 52). 
Courts of review have been loathe to upset jury findings 
with respect to the money damage involved in the loss of 
an eye. In National Bt·ands t'. L11orton Tire Co., S. Ct. Fla. 
( 1942) 150 Fla. 349, 7 SE (2d) 456, the Court said: "It is 
impossible to fix the value of the human eye. There can be 
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no doubt that such a loss is tremendous." That concept per-
meates all the decisions where the question is considered. A 
discussion as to the amounts of verdicts both by juries and 
awards by judges on the loss of one eye or for blindness 
in one eye is treated at Belli, Vol 5, Modern Trials, Damages, 
Section 212, beginning at page 253. Cases are tabulated from 
state and federal courts beginning at page 2 55. Annotations 
on the subject as far as reported cases are concerned are at 
16 ALR (2d) 130, 420, 102 ALR 1258, 1259, and 46 ALR 
1282, 1283. In Lopez v. Price (1958) 145 Conn. 560, 145 
Atl. (2d) 127, the court considered the question as to 
whether an award of $75,000 for reduction of vision in one 
eye and related injuries was excessive. It said: 
ttThe test is whether the amount of each award com-
plained of falls somewhere within the necessarily un-
certain limits of just damages or whether the size of 
the award so shocks the sense of justice as to compel 
the conclusion that the jury were influenced by par-
tiality, prejudice, mis.take or corruption. The refusal 
of the trial court to disturb a verdict is strong support 
for its propriety. Sheiman v. Sheiman, 143 Conn. 222, 
224, 121 A.2d 285. The question is one peculiarly 
within the province of the jury. Juries may differ widely 
in the conclusions which they reach in apparently simi-
lar cases, and, in fact, in any given case one jury might 
arrive at a result substantially different from that of 
another jury. This flexibility, though it may lead to 
uncertainty, is a necessary concomitant of the jury 
system as it operates. 
* * * * 
ttThe vision in her right eye was reduced to 20/200, 
which is considered the ophthalmological equivalent 
of total loss of vision in that eye. She cannot read fine 
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print or do very fine work such as sewing. If she ever 
works in a factory, she will not be able to put s~all 
parts together. She will not be_ ab_le to do clencal 
work. As far as earning capactty ts conc~rned, h~r 
right eye is for all practical p~r.Poses blmd. Th1s 
impairment is permanent. In addttton _t? 100 per cent 
loss of vision in the right eye, her abtltty to use both 
eyes for depth perception has dis~ppeared: She will 
not be able to take part in sports ltke tennts, baseball 
or handball, where there is a fast moving object. She 
will have difficulty in judging the position of any fast 
moving object, such as a moving automobile. She 
will be handicapped in driving. She will have a rela· 
tively blind side on her right and will tend to bump 
into things on that side. . . . However, the most itn 
portant residual, regardless of the 100 per cent loss 
of vision, the lack of depth perception and the walleye, 
is the fact she is now left with no reserve eye. 
u (The question of damages in personal injury cases, 
especially in these times of changing values, is always 
a difficult one. Prosser v. Richman, 133 Conn. 253, 256, 
50 A. 2d 85. Assessment of damages is peculiarly within 
the province of the jury and their determination should 
be set aside only when the verdict is plainly excessive 
and exorbitant. Szivos v. Leonard, 113 Conn. 522, 525, 
155 A. 637; Rutkowski v. Conn. Light & Power Co., 
100 Conn. 49, 54, 123 A. 25. Proper compensation for 
personal injuries cannot be computed by mathematical 
formula, and the law furnishes no precise rule for their 
assessment. Russakoff v. Stamford, 134 Conn. 450, 455, 
58 A. 2d 517; Samaha v. Mauro, 104 Conn. 300, 302, 
132 A. 455; Knight v. Continental Automobile Mfg. 
Co., 82 Conn. 291, 293, 73 A. 751. The only practical 
test to apply to a verdict is \Yhether the award of dam-
a_ge~ falls s.omewhere within the necessarily uncertain 
ltmtts of fatr and reasonable compensation in the parti-
cular case, or whether the verdict so shocks the sense 
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of justice as to compel the conclusion that the jury were 
influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake or corrup-
tion.' Slabinski v. Dix, 138 Conn. 625, 629, 88 A. 2d 
115, 117. In the light of this test, the jury could reason-
ably have returned the verdict awarding the plaintiff 
Pamela Lopez $75,000. Consequently, we cannot say 
that the amount of the award to her was excessive." 
The case of Chan v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co. (1955) 
132 Cal. App. (2d) 420, 287 P(2d) 78, is also helpful on 
the facts. In that case a 48-year-old plaintiff suffered the loss 
of his right eye when he was struck by a concrete chip which 
was the result of a piece of steel falling on a cement block. 
The cement chipped off and flew into plaintiff's eye and his 
action was under the FELA. The court sustained the recovery 
on the question of negligence and affirmed the trial judge's 
decision that $25,000 was a reasonable net recovery. 
The experts in this case tesified that the plaintiff had 
lost 100<fo of his vision in the left eye for all practical pur-
poses, and that at the time of the maximum recovery from 
the accident before cataract had formed on the left eye, his 
visual loss was 87 .3<fo (R. 160). A cataract can be removed 
only by surgery and the surgery could not be performed at 
the present time without producing double vision ( 161, 162) . 
Plaintiff has lost depth perception and has a severe restriction 
upon peripheral vision ( 163, 164). Neither doctor called by 
the plaintiff recommended that the cataract on the left eye 
be removed but testified "It is to his interest not to have it 
removed at this time" ( 164). 
The plaintiff's wife testified that in addition to the fact 
that he was in the hospital for approximately four weeks and 
lost seven weeks of work, she had observed marked changes 
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in the plaintiff's habits and attitudes since the accident (132). 
He cannot drive the car. He bumps his head getting in and 
out of the car. He stumbles and is slowed down. He is nervous, 
irritable and has had a heart attack ( 132, 133) · 
It is noteworthy that the defendant itself while conceding 
the propriety of including these factors in arriving at damages 
did not undertake to reduce damages by using mortality tables 
and interest rates in its presentation to the jury. 
Defendant asked the trial judge for a new trial on the 
grounds contended for in Point 7 of its brief to this Court 
(Ground No. 5 of the Motion for New Trial, R. 65). This 
question is generally addressed to the discretion of the trial 
court. The trial judge in this case heard the testimony of the 
witnesses, listened to the argument of counsel and denied 
the plaintiffs motion. There is nothing to suggest and defendant 
does not argue that he abused his discretion. 
The plaintiff in the case at bar was only 53 years of age 
at the time of the accident. Impairment of the total visual 
system was fixed without contradiction at 25<fo. All the 
limitations of body functions inherent in the loss will remain 
with plaintiff for the rest of his life. It is submitted that 
recovery in the net amount of $22,500 is easily within the 
range of discretion which necessarily is given to juries in cases 
of this kind. Certainly it does not tend to indicate passion or 
prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
Points II through VIII as treated by appellant in its brief 
are manifestly of the fly specking variety. The case \Yas tried 
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to a jury which was virtually hand-picked by the defendant. 
If any irregularity occurred in its selection, it was thought at 
the time to be for the defendant's benefit. The defendant 
acquiesced and ratified any technical deficiencies. Not having 
brought them to the attention of the trial court at the time, 
it cannot urge error here. Individually and collectively the 
instructions were fair and ade9uate. Considered as a whole, 
the instructions were most favorable to the defendant, and the 
verdict was well within the latitude necessarily given to juries 
in cases of this kind. 
At first blush it may appear that a question is presented 
as to whether there was evidence of negligence. It may be 
conceded for the purpose of argument that an ordinary roll 
of wire hanging on a nail may not be unsafe, but analysis of 
the facts of this case compel the conclusion that the particular 
coil of wire involved here was a dangerous trap. The jury 
necessarily found that the trap was sprung when the weight 
of the coil released the ends and one of them flipped like 
lightning and struck plaintiff's eye. This is the crux of the 
case. Under Rogers v. Missouri Railroad and subsequent 
cases, the jury's verdict is conclusive on the defendant in this 
court. The judgment must be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLARENCE M. BECK 
Felt Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
GEORGE M. McMILLAN 
1020 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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